Based on implemented policies, Italy’s GHG emissions are expected to increase to 449 MtCO₂e by 2030 (excl. forestry). This emission pathway is not compatible with the Paris Agreement.¹

Italy committed to the joint NDC of the European Union. The EU’s NDC is not consistent with the Paris Agreement’s temperature limit but would lead to a warming of between 2°C and 3°C.²

Italy’s sectoral policies are still falling short of being consistent with the Paris Agreement, especially with respect to renewable energy and energy efficiency in buildings.³

The state-owned operator of natural gas transmission in Italy announced a €4.7bn investment in gas networks.

As part of its 2017 Energy Strategy, Italy has announced the phase-out of coal power by 2025.

Italy announced in 2017 the target of having 1 million electric vehicles on the road by 2022.

This country profile is part of the Brown to Green 2018 report. The full report and other G20 country profiles can be downloaded at: http://www.climate-transparency.org/g20-climate-performance/g20report2018
ITALY'S EXPOSURE TO CLIMATE IMPACTS

This indicator shows the extent to which human society and its supporting sectors are affected by the future changing climate conditions based on an approximately 2°C scenario. This sectoral exposure will be even higher given that the efforts depicted in current NDCs will lead to an approximately 3°C scenario.

FOOD
Projected climate impacts on cereal yields
Projected increase of food demand due to population growth

WATER
Projected climate impacts on annual run-off
Projected climate impacts on annual groundwater recharge

HEALTH
Projected climate impacts on a spread of malnutrition and diarrhoeal diseases
Projected climate impacts on spread of vector-borne diseases

ECOSYSTEM SERVICE
Projected climate impacts on biomes occupying the countries
Projected climate impacts on marine biodiversity

HUMAN HABITAT
Projected climate impacts on frequency of high temperature periods
Projected climate impacts on frequency and severity of floods

INFRASTRUCTURE
Projected climate impacts on hydropower generation capacity
Proportion of coastline impacted by sea level rise

Own composition based on ND-GAIN 2017 (based on data for 2016)
Italy’s GHG emissions decreased by 17% between 1990 and 2015 but this trend is not expected to continue. Instead, emissions are projected to increase slightly towards 2030. Energy is the main emission source.
ITALY

ENERGY MIX

Total primary energy supply (PJ)

Source: Enerdata 2018

SHARE OF FOSSIL FUELS AND 'ZERO-CARBON' FUELS IN ENERGY SUPPLY

'ZERO-CARBON' SHARES

Source: Enerdata 2018

PERFORMANCE RATING OF SHARE OF FOSSIL FUELS

Recent developments (2012-2017)

Current level (2017)

Source: own evaluation

PERFORMANCE RATING OF SHARE OF ZERO-CARBON TECHNOLOGY

Recent developments (2012-2017)

Current level (2017)

Source: own evaluation

Zero-carbon fuels include nuclear, hydropower, new renewables. In Italy, these account for 16% of energy supply, slightly above the G20 average of 14%.

In Italy, these account for 16% of energy supply, slightly above the G20 average of 14%.
**NEW RENEWABLES**

Total primary energy supply (TPES) from new renewables (PJ)

Source: Enerdata 2018

“New renewables” excludes unsustainable renewable sources such as large hydropower. New renewables make up 11% of Italy’s energy supply – this is one of the highest levels in the G20 (G20 average: 5%). Supply from new renewables increased by 20% (2012–2017), with solar and wind energy gaining strength.

**ENERGY USE PER CAPITA**

Total primary energy supply (TPES) per capita (GJ/capita)

Source: Enerdata 2018

Energy use per capita in Italy is slightly above the G20 average but has decreased at a rate of 7% (2012–2017).
**ENERGY INTENSITY OF THE ECONOMY**

This indicator quantifies how much energy is used for each unit of GDP. The energy intensity of Italy’s economy is the second lowest in the G20 and has decreased at a rate of 6% (2012–2017), slower than the G20 average (-11%).

**PERFORMANCE RATING OF ENERGY INTENSITY**

The energy intensity of Italy’s economy is the second lowest in the G20 and has decreased at a rate of 6% (2012–2017), slower than the G20 average (-11%).

**CARBON INTENSITY OF THE ENERGY SECTOR**

The carbon intensity of Italy’s energy sector decreased at one of the highest rates, 8% (2012–2017), in the G20. The level is now below the G20 average.

**PERFORMANCE RATING OF CARBON INTENSITY**
## Decarbonisation

### Italy

#### Power Sector Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Italy 2017</th>
<th>G20 Average 2016</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electricity Demand Per Capita (kWh/capita)</td>
<td>4,956</td>
<td>3,720</td>
<td>-8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emissions Intensity of the Power Sector (gCO₂/kWh)</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>-16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Renewables in Power Generation (incl. large hydro)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>+34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Population with Access to Electricity</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Share of Population with Biomass Dependency</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Transport Sector Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Italy 2015</th>
<th>G20 Average 2016</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Transport Emissions Per Capita (tCO₂/capita)</td>
<td>1.69</td>
<td>1.13</td>
<td>-4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motorisation Rate (Vehicles per 1000 inhabitants)</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>490</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Passenger Transport (modal split in % of passenger-km)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>869</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight Transport (modal split in % of tonne-km)</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freight Transport (modal split in % of tonne-km)</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Industry Sector Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Italy 2015</th>
<th>G20 Average 2016</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Industry Emissions Intensity (tCO₂/sectoral GDP (PPP))</td>
<td>0.16</td>
<td>0.357</td>
<td>-17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Building Sector Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Italy 2017</th>
<th>G20 Average 2016</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Building Emissions Per Capita (tCO₂/capita)</td>
<td>1.05</td>
<td>0.48</td>
<td>-10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Agriculture Sector Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Italy 2015</th>
<th>G20 Average 2016</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture Emissions Intensity (tCO₂/sectoral GDP (PPP))</td>
<td>0.90</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>-2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Forest Sector Indicators

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Italy 2015</th>
<th>G20 Average 2016</th>
<th>Trend</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Forest Area Compared to 1990 Level (%)</td>
<td>122%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*The trend number shows developments over the past five years, where data is available.*
Italy has a national target of reducing GHG emissions in 2020 by 18% below 2005 levels. As an EU member state, Italy did not submit its own NDC under the Paris Agreement, committing instead to the EU NDC. The CAT rates the EU’s NDC “insufficient” as it is not ambitious enough to limit warming to below 2°C, let alone to 1.5°C. Under current policies, the EU is not on track to meet its 2030 target.

The table presents the NDC of the European Union that includes contributions from all member states.

### Mitigation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Overall targets</th>
<th>Coverage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>At least 40% domestic GHG emissions reduction compared to 1990 by 2030</td>
<td>100% of emissions covered (all sectors and gases)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Adaptation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Not mentioned</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Finance

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conditionality</th>
<th>Not applicable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Investment needs</td>
<td>Not specified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Actions</td>
<td>Not mentioned</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| International market mechanisms | No contribution from international credits for the achievement of the target |

Source: CAT 2018

---

**CLIMATE POLICY**

**COMPATIBILITY OF CLIMATE TARGETS WITH THE PARIS AGREEMENT**

- **Italy**

**CLIMATE ACTION TRACKER (CAT) EVALUATION OF NDC**

- **Critically insufficient**
- **Highly insufficient**
- **Insufficient**
- **2°C compatible**
- **1.5°C Paris Agreement compatible**
- **Role model**

Source: CAT 2018

---

**NATIONALLY DETERMINED CONTRIBUTION (NDC)**

The table presents the NDC of the European Union that includes contributions from all member states.
POLICY EVALUATION

The ratings evaluate a selection of policies that are essential pre-conditions for the longer-term transformation required to meet the 1.5°C limit. They do not represent a complete picture of what is necessary.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Rating</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GHG emissions target for 2050 or beyond</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Yes, Italy has a target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long-term low emissions development strategy</td>
<td>high</td>
<td>Yes, Italy has a strategy.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Italy has no long-term emission strategy nor a 2050 emission target.

POWER

- **Renewable energy in power sector**: Low
- **Coal phase-out**: High

No 2050 renewable target exists. In an effort to reduce energy dependency, Italy’s 2017 National Energy Strategy envisages an increase of renewables in electricity demand from 39% currently to 55% by 2030. The strategy is to be revised in 2019.

TRANSPORT

- **Phase-out fossil fuel light duty vehicles**: Medium

Under EU law, Italy is required to reduce CO2 emissions of vehicles per km and to increase the share of biofuels. Italy plans to have 1 million EV vehicles on the road by 2022 but has not taken implementing measures, and plans to more than triple the share of renewables in transport to 21% by 2030, but has no phase-out target for fossil fuel vehicles.

BUILDINGS

- **Near-zero energy new buildings**: High

Italy is obliged under EU law to have all new buildings near zero energy from 2020 onwards.

INDUSTRY

- **Low-carbon new industry installations**: Medium

Italy forms part of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme and uses a white certificate scheme to reduce energy consumption of all end uses.

FORESTS

- **Net zero deforestation**: Medium

Italy adopted a new Forest Law in 2018 that requires the government to adopt a new Forest Strategy.
CCPI EXPERTS’ POLICY EVALUATION

Italy’s experts give the country a low rating for its national climate policy performance. They maintain that Italy lacks clear long-term targets and measures for implementing its long-term strategies domestically. They also criticise the cutting back of incentives for renewable energy. Despite playing a constructive role in the context of the G7 process, Italian experts criticise their country for not being proactive enough. They thus rate Italy’s international climate policy performance as medium.

JUST TRANSITION

Italy’s fossil fuel is supplied predominantly from imported oil and gas. In 2017, the Italian government published and ratified the National Energy Strategy, setting out the country’s energy plans to 2030. This targets raising the share of renewables to 28% of primary energy supply and 55% of electricity generation, as well as the phase-out of coal in electricity generation by 2025. Around 90% of Italy’s coal supply is imported, and therefore the coal phase-out may have less of an impact on upstream workers, compared with other G20 nations. Nevertheless, while not referring to explicit just transition policy, the strategy does call for “timely actions to retrain workers and create new jobs and skills”. In June 2018, Italy’s new Prime Minister, Giuseppe Conte, pledged to “work to speed up the process, already in progress, of the ‘decarbonisation’ of [Italy’s] production system.”
FINANCING THE TRANSITION

ITALY

FINANCIAL POLICIES AND REGULATIONS

Through policy and regulation governments can overcome challenges to mobilising green finance, including: real and perceived risks, insufficient returns on investment, capacity and information gaps.

APPROACHES TO IMPLEMENTING THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES (TCFD)

This indicator establishes the degree of government engagement with the recommendations of the G20 Financial Stability Board’s Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No formal engagement with TCFD</th>
<th>Political and regulatory engagement</th>
<th>Formal engagement with private sector</th>
<th>Publication of guidance and action plans</th>
<th>Encoding into law</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Under the Italian Presidency, the G7 (minus the US) welcomed the work of the TCFD. In 2017, Italy’s central bank also endorsed the TCFD. The Ministry of the Environment’s newly created National Observatory on Sustainable Finance will discuss the impact of environmental issues on Italy’s financial system and has already engaged banks, insurance companies and asset managers through a TCFD-relevant survey.

FISCAL POLICY LEVERS

Fiscal policy levers raise public revenues and direct public resources. Critically, they can shift investment decisions and consumer behaviour towards low-carbon, climate-resilient activities by reflecting externalities in prices.

FOSSIL FUEL SUBSIDIES

In 2016, Italy provided US$13.5bn in fossil fuel subsidies (US$2.3bn in 2007). Between 2007 and 2016, subsidies were greater (US$0.004) than the G20 average (US$0.003) as a proportion of GDP. Subsidies primarily targeted consumption (93%), provided through direct budget support and tax exemptions. In absolute terms, the largest subsidy is the differential excise tax for diesel fuel (US$5.3bn in 2016).

CARBON REVENUES

Italy has no national carbon tax or emissions trading scheme, but forms part of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme that, in 2017, generated US$0.6bn in Italy alone. The scheme covers 45% of EU emissions (in power, industry and aviation), priced at US$21/tCO₂ as of September 2018. In 2012 to 2017, Italy’s carbon revenues were lower (US$0.0002) than the G20 average (US$0.0005) as a proportion of GDP.
Governments steer investments through their public finance institutions including via development banks, both at home and overseas, and green investment banks. Developed G20 countries also have an obligation to provide finance to developing countries and public sources are a key aspect of these obligations under the UNFCCC.

From 2013 to 2015, Italy’s public finance institutions spent an annual average of US$2.1bn brown, US$0.1bn green and US$0.8bn grey financing in the power sector, domestically and internationally. The largest transactions were a loan guarantee (US$1.2bn) for the MIDOR refinery expansion in Egypt, and an equity investment (US$0.9bn) in Ansaldo Energia.

Between 2013/14 and 2015/16, Italy has gone from the smallest G20 contributor of bilateral climate finance, to sixth place ahead of Australia and Canada. It remains the smallest contributor among the G20 members with obligations under the UNFCCC to the multilateral climate funds. More than half of bilateral spending goes to actions supporting both mitigation and adaptation (cross-cutting), while this figure increases to more than three-quarters for funding via the multilateral climate funds. While Italy may channel international public finance towards climate change via multilateral development banks, this has not been included in this report.

### PROVISION OF INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC SUPPORT

**OBBLIGATION TO PROVIDE CLIMATE FINANCE UNDER UNFCCC**

Yes

**CONTRIBUTIONS THROUGH THE MAJOR MULTILATERAL CLIMATE FUNDS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual average contribution (mn US$, 2015-2016)</th>
<th>Theme of support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Adaptation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31.27</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: See Technical Note for multilateral climate funds included and method to attribute amounts to countries

Source: Climate Funds Update 2017

**BILATERAL CLIMATE FINANCE CONTRIBUTIONS**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Annual average contribution (mn US$, 2015-2016)</th>
<th>Theme of support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>166.84</td>
<td>Mitigation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Country reporting to the UNFCCC

1) The 2030 projections of the future development of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions under current policies are based on the Climate Action Tracker (CAT) estimates.

2) The CAT is an independent scientific analysis that tracks progress towards the globally agreed aim of holding warming to well below 2°C, and pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C. The CAT “Effort Sharing” assessment methodology applies state-of-the-art scientific literature on how to compare the fairness of government efforts and (Intended) Nationally Determined Contribution (I) NDC proposals against the level and timing of emission reductions consistent with the Paris Agreement. The assessment of the temperature implications of a country’s NDC is based on the assumption that all other governments would follow a similar level of ambition.

3) This assessment is based on the policy evaluation on page 9 of this Country Profile.

4) Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is calculated by dividing GDP with mid-year population figures. GDP is the value of all final goods and services produced within a country in a given year. Here GDP figures at purchasing power parity (PPP) are used. Data for 2017.

5) The Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index published by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). It is a summary measure of average achievement in key dimensions of human development. A country scores higher when the lifespan is higher, the education level is higher, and GDP per capita is higher.

6) The ND-GAIN index summarises a country’s vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in combination with its readiness to improve resilience. This report looks only at the exposure indicators as part of the vulnerability component of the ND-GAIN index for six sectors. It displays the exposure scores provided by the ND-GAIN on a scale from low (score: 0) to high (score: 1).

7) The indicator covers all Kyoto gases showing historic emissions in each of the IPCC source categories (energy, industrial processes, agriculture, etc.). Emissions projections (excl. forestry) under a current policy scenario until 2030 are taken from the Climate Action Tracker and scaled to the historical emissions from PRIMAP (see Brown to Green Report 2018 Technical Note).

8) The ratings on GHG emissions are taken from the Climate Change Performance Index (CCPI) 2018. The rating of “current level compared to a well below 2°C pathway” is based on a global scenario of GHG neutrality in the second half of the century and a common but differentiated convergence approach.

9) CO₂ emissions cover only the emissions from fossil fuels combustion (coal, oil and gas) by sector. They are calculated according to the UNFCCC methodology (in line with the 2006 IPCC Guidelines for National Greenhouse Gas Inventories).

10) Total primary energy supply data displayed in this Country Profile does not include non-energy use values. Solid fuel biomass in residential use has negative environmental and social impacts and is shown in the category “other.”

11) Zero-carbon fuels include nuclear, hydropower and new renewables (non-residential biomass, geothermal, wind, solar).

12) Climate Transparency ratings assess the relative performance across the G20. A high scoring reflects a good effort from a climate protection perspective but is not necessarily 1.5°C compatible.

13) New renewables include non-residential biomass, geothermal, wind and solar energy. Hydropower and solid fuel biomass in residential use are excluded due to their negative environmental and social impacts.

14) Total primary energy supply (TPES) per capita displays the historical, current and projected energy supply in relation to a country’s population. Alongside the intensity indicators (TPES/GDP and CO₂/TPES), TPES per capita gives an indication on the energy efficiency of a country’s economy. In line with a well below 2°C limit, TPES per capita should not grow above current global average levels. This means that developing countries are still allowed to expand their energy use to the current global average, while developed countries have to simultaneously reduce it to that same number.

15) TPES per GDP describes the energy intensity of a country’s economy. This indicator illustrates the efficiency of energy usage by calculating the energy needed to produce one unit of GDP. Here GDP figures at PPP are used. A decrease in this indicator can mean an increase in efficiency but also reflects structural economic changes.

16) The carbon intensity of a country’s energy sector describes the CO₂ emissions per unit of total primary energy supply and gives an indication of the share of fossil fuels in the energy supply.
BROWN TO GREEN: THE G20 TRANSITION TO A LOW-CARBON ECONOMY | 2018

**ANNEX (continued)**

17) The selection of policies rated and the assessment of 1.5°C compatibility are informed by the Paris Agreement and the Climate Action Tracker (2016). The ten most important short-term steps to limit warming to 1.5°C. The table below displays the criteria used to assess a country’s policy performance. See the Brown to Green Report 2018 Technical Note for the sources used for this assessment.

18) The CCPI evaluates a country’s performance in national climate policy, as well as international climate diplomacy through feedback from national experts from non-governmental organisations to a standardised questionnaire.

19) See the Brown to Green 2018 Technical Note for the sources used for this assessment.

20) The University of Cambridge Institute for Sustainability Leadership (CISL) in early 2018 reviewed the progress made by the national regulatory agencies of G20 members in making the Task Force on Climate-related Financial Disclosures (TCFD) recommendations relevant to their national contexts. See the Brown to Green Report 2018 Technical Note for more information on the assessment.

21) This data includes bilateral public finance institutions such as national development banks and other development finance institutions, overseas aid agencies, export credit agencies, as well as key multilateral development banks. The analysis omits most finance delivered through financial intermediaries and significant volumes of multilateral development bank (MDB) development policy finance (due to a lack of clarity on power finance volumes). Given a lack of transparency, other important multilateral institutions in which G20 governments participate are not covered. See the Brown to Green Report 2018 Technical Note for further details.

22) Finance delivered through multilateral climate funds comes from Climate Funds Update, a joint ODI/Heinrich Boell Foundation database that tracks spending through major multilateral climate funds. See the Brown to Green Report 2018 Technical Note for multilateral climate funds included and method to attribute approved amounts to countries.

23) Bilateral finance commitments are sourced from Biennial Party reporting to the UNFCCC. Financial instrument reporting is sourced from the OECD-DAC; refer to the Brown to Green Report 2018 Technical Note for more detail. Figures represent commitments of Official Development Assistance (ODA) funds to projects or programmes, as opposed to actual disbursements.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Criteria description</th>
<th>Low</th>
<th>Medium</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Frontrunner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>GHG emissions target for 2050 or beyond</strong></td>
<td>No emissions reduction target for 2050 or beyond</td>
<td>Existing emissions reduction target for 2050 or beyond</td>
<td>Existing emissions reduction target for 2050 or beyond and clear interim steps</td>
<td>Emissions reduction target to bring GHG emissions to at least net zero by 2050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Long-term low emissions development strategy</strong></td>
<td>No long-term low emissions strategy</td>
<td>Existing long-term low emissions strategy</td>
<td>Long-term low emissions strategy includes interim steps and/or sectoral targets</td>
<td>Long-term low emissions strategy towards full decarbonisation in the second half of the century; includes interim steps and/or sectoral targets, plus institutions and measures in place to implement and/or regularly review the strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Renewable energy in power sector</strong></td>
<td>Allianz Monitor 2018 Category 1.2 (targets) and 2 (policies), average 0-25</td>
<td>Allianz Monitor 2018 Category 1.2 (targets) and 2 (policies), average 26-60</td>
<td>Allianz Monitor 2018 Category 1.2 (targets) and 2 (policies), average 61-100</td>
<td>Allianz Monitor 2018 Category 1.2 (targets) and 2 (policies), 61-100 plus 100% renewables in the power sector by 2050 in place</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Coal phase-out</strong></td>
<td>No consideration or policy in place for phasing out coal</td>
<td>Significant action to reduce coal use implemented or coal phase-out under consideration</td>
<td>Coal phase-out decided and under implementation</td>
<td>Coal phase-out date compatible with 1.5°C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Phase-out of fossil fuel light duty vehicles (LDVs)</strong></td>
<td>No policy or emissions performance standards for LDVs in place</td>
<td>Energy/emissions performance standards or support for efficient LDVs</td>
<td>National target to phase out fossil fuel LDVs in place</td>
<td>Ban on new fossil-based LDVs by 2025/30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Near zero-energy new buildings</strong></td>
<td>No policy or low emissions building codes and standards in place</td>
<td>Building codes, standards or fiscal/financial incentives for low emissions options in place</td>
<td>National strategy for near zero-energy buildings (at least for all new buildings)</td>
<td>National strategy for near zero-energy buildings by 2020/25 (at least for all new buildings)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Low-carbon new industry installations</strong></td>
<td>No policy or support for energy efficiency in industrial production in place</td>
<td>Support for energy efficiency in industrial production (covering at least two of the country’s sub-sectors (e.g. cement and steel production))</td>
<td>Target for new installations in emissions-intensive sectors to be low-carbon</td>
<td>Target for new installations in emissions-intensive sectors to be low-carbon after 2020, maximising efficiency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Net zero deforestation</strong></td>
<td>No policy or incentive to reduce deforestation in place</td>
<td>Incentives to reduce deforestation or support schemes for reafforestation / reforestation in place</td>
<td>National target for reaching zero deforestation</td>
<td>National target for reaching zero deforestation by 2020s or for increasing forest coverage</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CLIMATE TRANSPARENCY

Partners:

Supported by:

Funders:

Data Partners:

http://www.climate-transparency.org/g20-climate-performance/g20report2018